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Abstract: 
 
Recent studies have debated the impact of investor protection laws on firms’ corporate 
policies.  I exploit the passage of state investor protection statutes (“blue sky laws”) in the 
U.S. in the early 20th century to estimate the effects of investor protection law on firm 
financing decisions and investment activity.  Regression estimates indicate that the 
passage of investor protection statutes causes firms to pay out greater dividends, issue 
more equity, and grow in size.  The introduction of investor protection law is also 
associated with improvements in operating performance and market valuations.  
Additional analysis suggests that alternative hypotheses for the measured changes in 
corporate policy and performance have limited explanatory power.  Overall, the evidence 
is strongly supportive of theoretical models which predict that investor protection laws 
have a significant impact on firm financing and investment policy.   
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Introduction 
Recent studies in corporate governance have debated the importance of legal 
institutions in shaping financial development.  One particular aspect of the legal 
environment which has received significant attention is the role of legal protection of 
investors from managerial expropriation.  Both the theoretical and the empirical literature 
reach mixed conclusions on the impact of investor protection laws on firm financing and 
investment decisions.  On one hand, a number of theories predict that investor protection 
laws have a significant impact on corporate policies.  These theories are supported by 
empirical studies which find cross-country differences in firm financing and investment 
patterns.  These differences are attributed to heterogeneous investor protections 
engendered by disparate legal origins (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(henceforth LLSV) 1997, 1998, 2000b, 2002, among others).  Some scholars, on the 
other hand, argue that cross-country differences in financing and investment patterns do 
not adequately capture the causal impact of legal development on corporate policy (Rajan 
and Zingales 2003, Pagano and Volpin 2001, 2005).  Additionally, various studies 
examine time-series variation in investor protection laws within countries such as the 
U.K. and Italy and find that legal protection of investors has little impact on ownership 
dispersion and financial development (Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 2009, Aganin and 
Volpin 2005). 
Empirical identification of the impact of investor protection law on firm financing 
and investment decisions requires a setting in which legal investor protections are well-
defined and vary independently of factors that are otherwise correlated with firms’ 
decisions on corporate policy.  I exploit the staggered passage of state investor protection 
statutes, also known as the blue sky laws, in the United States during the early 1900’s to 
identify the causal impact of investor protection laws on the financing and investment 
decisions of firms in the mining industry.  I compare the impact of investor protection 
laws on the financing and investment decisions of firms in states which passed blue sky 
laws during the sample period to contemporaneous changes in the corporate policies of 
firms in other states.  I also evaluate the relative operating performance and market 
valuations of firms during the sample period. 
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This paper addresses several critical limitations of previous empirical studies on 
the impact of investor protection law on firm corporate policy and performance.  First, it 
focuses on cross sectional and time series variation in investor protection laws within a 
single common law country (legal origin is fixed across states).  Second, I evaluate the 
impact of laws that were specifically aimed at reducing expropriation of shareholders by 
corporate insiders in an environment where investor fraud was rampant (Seligman 2003).  
The legal protections engendered by the laws are arguably more closely linked to the 
theories developed by LLSV (1997) than the measures of investor protections used in 
many other studies (LLS 2008, Coffee 2001).1  Third, I exploit exogenous variation in 
investor protection laws that is likely independent of unobserved variables which 
otherwise impact firm financing and investment decisions.  Examples of such variables 
are political lobbying efforts, changes in investment opportunities, and unobserved 
economic and financial shocks (an identification assumption explored in greater detail 
below).    
Estimates of the impact of state investor protection statutes suggest that greater 
investor protections cause sample treatment firms to increase dividend payouts to 
shareholders by approximately 10%.  Treatment firms also raise issuances of common 
stock outstanding by at least 11%.  Additionally, the blue sky laws cause firms to 
increase total levels of physical capital by at least 36% while total firm assets increase by 
at least 17%.  The results are strongly supportive of theoretical models which predict that 
investor protection laws have a significant impact on the financing and investment 
policies of firms (LLSV 1997, 1998, LLS 2008, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  
Improvements in the legal protection of investors are also associated with increases in 
operating performance; return on assets (ROA) generally increases by at least 6% for 
sample firms while market-to-book valuations, measured by market capitalization to cash 
flow ratios, increase significantly.     
The causal interpretation of the regression estimates relies on the identification 
assumption that the passage of the investor protection statutes by various states in the 
U.S. during the early 20th century is independent of other factors which would otherwise 
                                                 
1 In particular, the early 20th century was characterized by widespread securities fraud in the mining 
industry (Mahoney 2003).   
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impact corporate policy and performance.  This assumption is supported by numerous 
sources.  Furthermore, various hypotheses suggesting a violation of this assumption are 
empirically tested and found to lack significant explanatory power.  
First, as discussed further in Section 2, there is ample anecdotal evidence that the 
passage of the laws is largely due to increased securities fraud which took place at the 
turn of the century (Seligman 2003).  The laws appear to be driven exclusively by the 
public interests of security market participants at the time; this claim is further 
corroborated by the fact that eventually all states (except Nevada) chose to adopt blue sky 
laws.  It is possible, however, that the laws may have been influenced by the political 
lobbying efforts of incumbent firms.  As discussed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), many 
investor protection laws could simply result from incumbent firms who wish to reduce 
competition from potential market entrants by raising the costs of external financing.  As 
a consequence of reduced entry by competitors, incumbent firms would increase profits 
due to their improved monopoly power in product markets.  This hypothesis would 
predict that the passage of investor protection laws would allow incumbent firms to 
increase profits by producing fewer quantities of goods at higher prices.  Using product 
market data, however, I find that the passage of the blue sky laws instead led to increases 
in the quantities of goods sold, while the prices of goods remained unchanged or lower; 
i.e. product markets appear to be more competitive after the laws are passed.  Thus, the 
passage of the blue sky laws does not appear to be driven by product market gains for 
incumbent firms.   
Second, I present two sets of analyses which examine whether the passage of the 
blue sky laws appears to be correlated with either gradual or immediate changes in 
unobservable investment opportunities.2  I find that there are no significant pre-existing 
trends in corporate policy and performance prior to the passage of the blue sky laws.  The 
estimated impact of the laws is significant only after the laws are passed.  I also examine 
the effects of the blue sky laws on firms located in Michigan and West Virginia.  Both 
states initially passed blue sky laws in 1913, however, the laws were declared 
unconstitutional by federal courts soon thereafter.  The states then passed modified 
                                                 
2 The analyses are also relevant for addressing the importance of other potential unobserved covariates that 
could be correlated with the passage of the laws.   
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versions of the laws in 1915 which were upheld by the Supreme Court.  I observe 
changes in corporate policy and performance for firms in these two states only after the 
laws are passed in 1915 – not after the laws are passed initially in 1913.  The evidence 
suggests that regression estimates do not suffer from biases resulting from unobserved 
changes in investment opportunities or other unobserved factors that are correlated with 
the passage of the blue sky laws.  Third, I examine whether firms respond to the passage 
of the investor protection statutes by relocating their states of incorporation.  All but one 
sample firm, however, do not change location during the sample period, suggesting that 
regression estimates do not suffer from selection bias.   
I also test whether the observed impact of the blue sky laws occurs through the 
channel of reduced expropriation risk or through the channel of reduced adverse selection 
in security dealer markets.  The blue sky laws provided investors with a legal basis for 
recovering damages from firms that were deemed to be fraudulent following public 
security issuances.  In addition, many laws also required that securities (and securities 
dealers) be registered with the government prior to any public issuance.  It is therefore 
possible that the impact of the blue sky laws is manifest through the channel of reduced 
adverse selection at the pre-clearance stage rather than through the reduced risk of 
expropriation by insiders conditional on securities already being issued.  This hypothesis 
is evaluated using a subsample of data consisting of firms in states which passed laws 
exclusively centered on ex-post fraud reduction rather than ex-ante screening of 
securities.  I find a significant impact of the laws on corporate policy for this set of firms, 
suggesting that the blue sky laws had an impact through reduced expropriation risk by 
insiders.   
 This paper contributes to two related strands of literature.  First, this paper utilizes 
a unique dataset and empirical approach to provide evidence that investor protection laws 
have a significant causal impact on corporate policy and performance.  The findings add 
to research that examines the linkages between legal institutions and financial 
development.3  The results are strongly supportive of the theoretical models developed by 
                                                 
3 Papers in this area include Benmelech and Bergmann (2008), Carlin and Gervais (2008), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998), Fisman and Love (2004), Foley and Greenwood (2009), Glaeser, Johnson, and 
Shleifer (2001), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003, 
2007), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Wurgler (2000), among many others. 
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LLSV (1997, 1998) (among others).  Second, this paper contributes to recent debate over 
the development of the emerging financial markets of Eastern European and Asian 
countries by highlighting the potential outcomes of reforms aimed at protecting investors 
from securities fraud (Klapper and Love, 2002).    
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 contains institutional 
background describing the blue sky laws and the various political economy explanations 
for their passage.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 contains the analysis.  Section 5 
concludes.   
 
Section 2:  Institutional Background 
The blue sky laws were securities fraud statutes passed by various states between 
1911 and 1931 to prevent investor expropriation by insiders such as managers and 
securities dealers.  The laws required that security issuers and dealers register with state 
governments (typically the state banking departments) prior to issuing public securities, 
and receive approval from the government before selling any securities in the state 
(Mahoney 2003).  Perhaps most importantly, the laws also provided investors with a legal 
basis and cause of action for recovering assets fraudulently expropriated by security 
issuers or salesmen, even after a significant passage of time between the initial security 
purchase and the time of the alleged expropriation (Read and Washburn 1921, Virginia 
Law Review 1937).    
Prior to the Securities Act of 1933 and the formation of the SEC with the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, federal securities regulation in the United States was 
largely nonexistent (Seligman, 2003).  In addition, there was little in the way of state 
securities market regulation prior to the passage of the blue sky laws (Macey and Miller 
1991).  Different states in the U.S. passed blue sky statutes at different times, exhibiting 
heterogeneity in the requirements that were placed upon securities issuers.  The first 
investor protection law was passed in Kansas in 1911, the second in Arizona in 1912.  In 
1913, many states such as California, Maine, Missouri, Montana, and Texas passed blue 
sky laws.  Two states, Michigan and West Virginia, passed laws in 1913, which were 
soon after declared unconstitutional by lower federal courts (Alabama &c. Co. v. Doyle, 
201 Fed 173; Compton v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537; Bracey v. Darst, 218 Fed. 482).  These 
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states later proposed and passed modified versions of the original laws in 1915.  The 
modified statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court (Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 
539; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Co., 242 U.S. 559; Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 
568).  Almost all states in the sample passed blue sky laws that required registration and 
pre-clearance of securities prior to any public offerings.  Maine was the lone exception; 
though its laws did provide a basis for claiming damages in the case of ex-post fraud 
(Mahoney 2003).4   
The motivation for passing the investor protection statutes is largely attributed to 
rampant securities fraud at the turn of the 20th century (Seligman 1983, Reed and 
Washburn 1921, Mulvey 1914).  Many scholars claim that a large number firms and 
securities salesmen took advantage of “naïve” investors by selling them securities backed 
by little more than a promise of extraordinary returns.  In fact, the colloquial name of the 
‘blue sky’ laws is attributed to the opinion of Justice Joseph McKenna in Hall v. Geiger-
Jones: 
 
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed – that is, to use 
the language of a cited case, “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so 
many feet of blue sky;” or, as stated by counsel in another case, “to stop the sale of stock 
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent 
exploitations.”   
 
The types of firms targeted by the laws were largely companies in the mining, oil, 
and gas sectors (Reed and Washburn 1921).  Some states, such as North Dakota (Comp. 
Law, Secs. 4989-4994) and Connecticut (Conn. Gen. St., Sec. 3461-3464) went so far as 
to introduce statutes aimed specifically at regulating the sale of mining securities.  Firms 
in these industries were among the most likely to approach investors with intangible 
assets and highly speculative business plans that would later turn out to be facades for 
fraudulent operations (Mahoney 2003).  Examples of such fraud are plentiful.  The 
following accounts from Nation’s Business (1922) describe common occurrences among 
duped investors: 
 
                                                 
4 The institutional features of the blue sky laws in Maine, Michigan, and West Virginia are utilized in the 
analysis to test the validity of a number of alternative hypotheses.   
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One man was induced to invest in a Mississippi oil company by a friend who had gone to 
work for the concern.  Through the Investors’ Protective Committee he finally learned the 
truth about the fake stock and further, “that there had never been a barrel of oil found in 
Mississippi,” and that the company from which the securities were bought could not even 
be located.  
 
In another instance, one woman wrote: 
 
A year ago last July, 1920, a sleek, smooth-talking agent came to my house and began to 
talk oil to me, and he said my money would be giving me big dividends just as soon as 
the wells were operating….Well, the last I have heard is they cannot go on with the 
drilling until the investors come forward with another 20 percent cash payment on their 
investment, otherwise it’s a foregone conclusion of the whole matter.   
 
To combat such behavior, state legislators developed the blue sky laws to prevent 
fraudulent security issuances.  Prior to issuing securities, a typical blue sky law would 
require a firm to submit information about its officers, board of directors, historical 
financial information, state of incorporation, properties, locations of headquarters and 
operating units.  This information was collected to verify legitimacy of the offering and 
provide public records of company activity should the firm be liable for committing fraud 
after a security issuance.  Firms would also be required to provide additional information 
at the request of state officials, either at the time of the proposed offering or any time 
thereafter.  An example of such information was the proposed use of capital raised 
through the security issue.  In addition, firms would be subject to appraisals, audits, and 
investigations of properties by state officials.  Such reviews would be at the expense of 
the issuer rather than the government.  If the security offering was approved by officials, 
the firm would receive a permit to sell securities to the public within the state.  Finally, 
the laws provided a cause of action for investors who claimed fraud by security issuers.  
If a firm was found liable by courts to have committed securities fraud, by absconding 
investor funds or misusing assets for example, then investors would be able to recover 
damages from the firm via judicial proceedings (Reed and Washburn 1921, Virginia Law 
Review 1937).   
There is ample evidence that the laws had a binding effect on the behavior of 
security issuers both large and small.  Mulvey (1914) performed an audit study of the 
regulatory actions of the state banking commission of Kansas, the earliest adopter of the 
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blue sky laws, and found that within 2 years of the adoption of the law in 1911, Kansas 
had already denied the applications of 62 firms to sell their securities in Kansas.  
Additionally, the Kansas state banking commissioner issued a report in 1912 stating that 
between “fourteen and fifteen hundred companies have been investigated by this 
department since the enactment of this law, and of this, less than one hundred have been 
granted permits to sell their securities in Kansas” (Mulvey, 1914).   
There were many reasons why security offerings were denied.  For example, in 
1924, the Continental Gas and Electric Corp., a 12 year old firm, wished to issue 
securities to purchase a controlling interest in the Kansas City Power and Light 
Company.  Continental planned to raise at least $5,000,000 worth of stock in order to 
consummate the purchase.  The commissioner of banking in Missouri, however, raised 
objections to the value of the Kansas City Power and Light Co., arguing that after the 
deduction of intangible items, cost of financing, and reserves for depreciation, the value 
of Kansas City Power and Light was too low to justify the proposed offering.  As a result, 
Continental’s application to issue stock in Missouri was denied in order to protect the 
public from an unsafe offering (Barron’s, 1924). 
The blue sky laws did not just impact firms at the security issuance stage.  Often 
times, the laws would be invoked during court proceedings by investors who sought to 
recover damages from firms well after securities offerings (Reed and Washburn 1921, 
Virginia Law Review 1937).  One example of such a case is Edward v. Ioor (205 Mich. 
617), in which the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff who wished to receive 
compensation for activity committed by a firm in violation of the blue sky laws.  Another 
example is Kneeland v. Emerton (280 Mass. 371).   
The various ways in which the blue sky laws applied to securities offerings 
reflects a significant improvement in the legal protection of investors from securities 
fraud.  Anecdotal evidence and academic research points to the reduction of securities 
fraud as the chief aim of regulators who passed the blue sky laws.  Some argue, however, 
that it is possible there were other motivations for the passage of the statutes.  For 
example, the laws may have been the outcomes of political processes that did not fully 
reflect the public interests of state constituents.  As discussed by Macey and Miller 
(1991), it is conceivable that the laws were promoted by the private interests of small 
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banks who wished to reduce competition with securities salesmen for depositors’ funds.  
Macey and Miller (1991) posit that mandatory registration of securities and securities 
salesmen increased costs of security issuance.  In response, firms would pass these 
increased costs onto investors, who would therefore prefer to invest in bank deposits 
rather than corporate securities.  This theory would suggest that the passage of the blue 
sky laws would be associated with deleterious effects on firm corporate policies and 
performance.5 
Another potential motivation for the passage of the blue sky laws is a variant of 
the political economy hypothesis developed by Rajan and Zingales (2003).6  Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) argue that some of the differences in investor protection levels across 
countries can be attributed to the political influence of industrial incumbent firms that 
promote capital market regulations as means of limiting product market entry by 
competitors.  In the context of the blue sky laws, this hypothesis would suggest that 
incumbent firms in various states were instrumental at promoting the passage of state 
investor protection statutes.  While anecdotal evidence does not suggest that such 
lobbying took place (at least overtly), this hypothesis is directly tested in Section 4.   
 
Section 3: Data 
The dataset is constructed using several sources of information.  First, I identify 
all mining firms which appear in the monthly “Banking and General Quotation” section 
of the December, 1915 issue of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle (CFC).  I choose 
this set of firms for three reasons.  First, this list of firms has publicly traded stock with 
published prices, allowing me to track share prices using publicly available information 
over time.  Second, I start with a list of firms appearing in the 1915 issue of the CFC 
because firms that are publicly traded in this year are likely to maintain stock price and 
financial statement information for at least two years before and after 1913 (the year in 
which most states pass their respective investor protection statutes).  Third, as discussed 
in Section 2, I focus on the mining industry because firms in this sector were considered 
the most likely to commit shareholder expropriation (Mahoney 2003, Seligman 2003) and 
                                                 
5 As discussed in more detail in Section 4, however, these predictions are rejected by the data. 
6 See Volpin and Pagano (2001, 2005) for similar models.   
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are therefore a natural starting point for estimating the impact of investor protection laws 
on corporate policy.  The CFC provides par values of stock, as well as bid and ask quotes 
for shares.  I collect stock prices for this sample of firms from the December issue of the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle from 1908 to 1917. 
For each firm in the December, 1915 CFC mining stock quotation list, I then 
collect background characteristics and financial statement information in the 1913, 1916, 
and 1918 volumes of Poor’s Manual of Industrial Securities.  I also identify mining firms 
in the 1916 and 1918 Poor’s volume for which I can collect similar information from 
1911 to 1917.  I collect brief descriptions of the company (such as products produced), 
state and year of incorporation, location of operations, names of officers and directors, 
name of exchanges on which its stock is traded, historical balance sheet and income 
statement data.  I confirm whether each firm is in the mining industry from the 
company’s name and from the company’s business description.  Each firm has varying 
amounts of information, both across accounting variables, as well as over time.  Thus, the 
final dataset is an unbalanced panel of firm balance sheet data, income statement 
information, outstanding shares, and stock price information. 
Many firms in the mining industry also publicly disclose “statements of 
operations” in the Poor’s manuals.  I use these statements to assemble product market 
data.  I identify every firm in the 1916 Poor’s manual that discloses information on the 
types of minerals or metal ores it produces, the quantity it sells each year, and the market 
prices of its products.  I then augment the time series of information for these firms using 
the 1913 and 1918 Poor’s manuals.   
Given the data collection methods and institutional features of the blue sky laws, 
it is possible that there are several sources of selection bias in the regression estimates.  
First, because data are collected from Poor’s manuals, it is likely that sample firms 
represent relatively larger, older companies in the U.S. since financial information about 
such companies was likely to be more accessible than that of smaller, younger firms.  
This source of bias is unlikely to be problematic, however, since larger, older firms 
would likely be impacted by the blue sky laws less than smaller, younger firms due to the 
likelihood of larger, older firms already having mitigated investors’ concerns of 
expropriation through established reputations.  Thus, such sample selection would likely 
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cause the regression analysis to underestimate the true impact of the laws on the average 
firm in the population during the sample period.   
Second, in response to the passage of the blue sky laws, it is conceivable that 
some firms would relocate their operations to new states of incorporation.  For example, a 
poorly performing firm belonging to a state which passes a blue sky law may choose to 
reincorporate in a state without a blue sky law to avoid securities registration costs and 
securities fraud liability.  Such behavior, however, is unlikely to be relevant for firms in 
our sample.  Almost all sample firms are incorporated well before 1913 and do not 
reincorporate anywhere else during the sample period.  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
regression estimates are biased by sample firm reincorporation decisions.7   
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of sample firm characteristics. There are a 
total of 108 unique firms with balance sheet data for the years 1899 to 1918, yielding a 
dataset of 887 firm-year observations.8  As Panel A indicates, the average year of 
incorporation is 1899; almost all sample firms are incorporated several years before their 
respective states of incorporation pass investor protection laws.  The average age of a 
firm in the sample is 13 years.  Panel B summarizes sample firm balance sheet and 
income statement characteristics in 1911, separately for firms located in states which pass 
blue sky laws during the sample period and firms located in states which pass blue sky 
laws after the sample period (i.e. after 1918).  As explained in the Analysis section, 
because the laws are staggered across time and eventually passed by all sample states 
(except Nevada), the breakdown of firms into these two groups is somewhat artificial.  In 
the estimation, any firm incorporated in a state which has not yet passed a law can be 
considered a control firm, while any firm incorporated in a state where a law has been 
passed can be considered a treatment firm.  Statistics from 1911 are presented to 
summarize firm characteristics prior to any law being passed by any sample state; the 
                                                 
7 It is also unlikely that the estimates are biased by a “Delaware effect” (Daines 2001).  As explained by 
Subramaniam (2004), Delaware’s charter laws became an issue primarily in the 1960s after a number of 
law changes were passed which caused Delaware to become the most popular destination for much of the 
incorporation activity at the time.  While today around half of all U.S. firms are incorporated in the U.S., 
less than 10% of sample firms are incorporated in Delaware.  To further verify that Delaware incorporated 
firms do not bias the regression estimates, I run all regression in Section 4 with Delaware firms removed 
from the sample; all regression results remain the same.   
8 The vast majority of firms have data from 1910 to 1917. 
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first sample state to pass a law is Arizona in 1912.  P-values from t-tests comparing firm 
characteristics between the two groups are also presented. 
The average firm in states which pass laws after 1918 produces $2.4 million in 
sales in 1911, while the average firm in states which pass laws during the sample period 
generates revenues of $2.5 million.  Both the level of sales and one-year sales growth 
rates between the two groups are statistically indistinguishable.  The two sets of firms 
have approximately 76% of their assets in Plant, Property, and Equipment (book value of 
PPE is $7.0 million on average, while book value of assets is $9.3 million).  Additional 
firm characteristics such as age, dividends-to-sales, return on assets, and market 
capitalization are statistically similar across both groups.  The market capitalization of 
firms in the latter group appears somewhat smaller in magnitude.  However, the large 
standard errors associated with the figures illustrate that the differences are due to the 
presence of several large outliers in the control sample; t-tests indicate that both sets of 
firms have statistically similar levels of market capitalization.9  While the differing 
absolute values of market capitalization between the two sets of firms may suggest 
differences between the sets of firms, these differences are unlikely to be problematic for 
the estimation.  First, it is important to note that the staggered nature of passage of the 
laws is utilized in the empirical framework to allow firms in states which pass blue sky 
laws during the sample period to serve as control firms in the estimation (in addition to 
firms in states which pass laws after 1918).  Second, all results hold when the sample is 
restricted to firms in states which pass the laws during the sample period.  Overall, the 
data suggest that there are no significant differences across firms in states which pass 
laws during the sample period and firms in states which pass laws after the sample 
period.10  
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Comparison of group medians using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test also indicates insignificant differences in 
market capitalization between the two groups.     
10 This issue is further addressed in the Analysis section.   
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Section 4: Analysis 
The effects of the blue sky laws on the financing and investment decisions of 
sample firms are estimated using the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model: 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi)  
                          + β5(Yeart) + εit 
(1)
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  In the 
subsections which follow, there are a number of different dependent variables which 
reflect various aspects of firms’ corporate policies:  Dividendsit/Salesit, Ln(Shares 
Oustandingit), Ln(PPEit), Ln(Assetsit), ROAit, and Market Capit/Cash Flowit.  IPLawit is an 
indicator of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection 
(IP) Law by year t.  Ln(Age)it is the log of the age of firm i in year t.  This variable is 
added to control for differences in corporate policy related to firm age, as investment in 
newly formed firms typically begins at a higher rate than established firms.  Firmi and 
Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  SalesGrowthit is the percentage 
change in sales of firm i from year t-1 to year t.  Following LLSV (2002), growth in sales 
is used as a proxy for investment opportunities.11  It is worth noting that this measure of 
investment opportunities is likely endogenous with the passage of the laws, and therefore 
its exclusion from the specifications is preferred to its inclusion.  However, this measure 
is included in some specifications to show that the results are not significantly affected by 
controlling for investment opportunities.   
IPLawit is effectively a difference-in-difference estimator of the impact of 
investor protection law on the dependent variable of interest.  In this framework, any firm 
incorporated in a state which has not yet passed a law can be considered a control firm, 
while any firm incorporated in a state where a law has been passed can be considered a 
treatment firm.  This assignment into treatment and control groups is due to the staggered 
passage of the laws across states, all of which eventually adopt investor protection 
statutes except for Nevada.  Firm fixed effects are included in all specifications to ensure 
                                                 
11 Because information in the liabilities portion of firms’ balance sheets is poorly disclosed for mining firms 
in Poor’s Manuals, it is difficult to precisely estimate book equity and debt, and therefore measure Tobin’s 
Q or Market to Book Equity Ratios as alternative measures of investment opportunities.   
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that static firm-specific differences across firms do not account for patterns in investment 
and financing. Year fixed effects, which control for year-specific changes in investment 
and financing, are included in most regressions.  Finally, standard errors in all regression 
are clustered by state in order to control for residual correlations of the error terms across 
firms within a given state.   
 
4.1 Financing Decisions 
4.1.1 Payout Policy 
The impact of investor protection statutes on firm dividend payouts to 
stockholders as a fraction of total sales, Dividendit / Salesit, is estimated using the 
following specification: 
 
Dividendit / Salesit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(Firmi) + β4(Yeart) + εit (2)
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  Dividendit / 
Salesit  is the ratio of total dividends to sales of firm i in year t.  All other variables are 
defined as in Specification 1.   
Table 2 contains the regression results.  Columns 1-3 present estimates of 
Specification 2 using dividends to common stock holders as the measure of total 
dividends in a given year.  The results indicate that the passage of the blue sky laws is 
associated with an economically large and statistically significant increase in the 
percentage of sales that are distributed as dividends.  Column 1 indicates a percentage 
increase of 2.6%, however when controlling for year fixed effects and firm age, the 
estimate is even larger, on the order of 9.3% - 9.8%.  The increase in the size of the 
estimate is not surprising, as there are likely time effects in firm sales and dividends 
across firms.  The positive coefficient on firm Age indicates that older firms also pay 
greater dividends, consistent with prior research.  Columns 4-5 present estimates using 
the sum of dividends to common stock and preferred stock as the measure of total 
dividends in a given year.  Though only seven firms in the sample offer preferred 
dividends in addition to common stock dividends, when such dividends are accounted 
for, the estimate of the blue sky law impact increases to 10.1%-10.5%.  The slight 
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increase in coefficient estimates implies that preferred dividends increase in response to 
the laws.  It is worth noting that since preferred stock holders have greater cash flow 
rights than common stock holders, it is likely that they are less subject to insider 
expropriation than common stock holders, therefore the impact of preferred dividends is 
likely to be positive, but smaller than the impact of investor protection laws on common 
dividends.  The results in Column 4-5 support this conjecture; furthermore, in results not 
reported here, when only preferred dividends-to-sales ratios are the dependent variable in 
Specification 2, the estimated coefficient for IPLaw is 0.13 with a robust standard error of 
0.18. 
The economic and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for IPLaw 
are consistent with the theory that increased investor protections cause firms to increase 
dividend payments to investors.  The estimates provide strong evidence consistent with 
the “outcome model” of LLSV (2000b).  The outcome model of dividends predicts that 
when minority shareholders are better protected from expropriation by insiders, they are 
able to put more pressure on managers to disgorge cash and increase dividend payments.  
As discussed in Section 2, much of the fraud which took place in the mining industry 
during this time period stemmed from investors being falsely promised extraordinary 
dividends in return for the stock investments.  When the blue sky laws were passed, the 
outcome theory suggests that investors were able to receive cash from operations that 
would be potentially expropriated by managers under the guise of legitimate excavation 
purposes.  The results in Table 2 indicate that investors indeed received greater dividend 
payments from firms, consistent with the predictions of the model.   
 
4.1.2 Equity Issuance 
The impact of investor protection statutes on firm common stock outstanding, 
Ln(Sharesit), is estimated using the following specification: 
 
Ln(Sharesit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi)  
                          + β5(Yeart) + εit 
(3)
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where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  Ln(Sharesit) is 
defined as the log of common shares outstanding of firm i in year t.12  All other variables 
are defined as in Specification 1.   
 Regression estimates are presented in Table 3.  Column 1 indicates that 
outstanding equity increases by 14% once a blue sky law is passed.13  When year fixed 
effects are included in Columns 2 and 3, and Age is included in Column 3, the estimate 
for IPLaw changes little, suggesting that equity issuance during the sample period is not 
significantly affected by aggregate fluctuations across years or firm age.  When sales 
growth is controlled for, as in Columns 4 and 5, the estimated impact of the laws on 
equity issuance remains economically large and statistically significant.  Across all 
specifications, the estimated impact of the blue sky laws on common stock outstanding is 
an increase of approximately 12-14%.   
Overall, the findings are strongly supportive of theories which predict greater 
investor protections lead to increased participation in equity markets (LLSV 1997, 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  The evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
increased investor protection from insider expropriation encourages firms to seek more 
outside financing because investors become more willing to partake in capital investment.  
This particular interpretation of the evidence stems from the assumption that new 
issuances of equity go to outside investors rather than insiders such as firm managers or 
directors.  This assumption is motivated in two ways.  First, the blue sky laws generally 
did not apply to issuances of securities to insiders such as managers or pre-existing stock 
holders, suggesting that if observed equity issuances were made to these groups, one 
should not observe a change in equity outstanding in response to the passage of the laws 
(Reed and Washburn 1921).  Second, the findings of Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan 
(1999) indicate that managerial stock ownership during the early part of the twentieth 
century was limited (at least relative to current times), suggesting that increases in 
common stock outstanding were unlikely to be realized by insiders exclusively.   
                                                 
12 Stock splits in the sample are rare. One treatment firm appears to have reduced shares outstanding by half 
after a law is passed.  I do not make any adjustment for this observation, which slightly reduces the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient for IPLaw. 
13 The estimated percentage change in the dependent variable given the passage of a blue sky law is given 
by 100*(exp(β1)-1)., if the regression specification is estimated using the log of the dependent variable.   
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The results are interesting given the institutional details surrounding the mining 
industry during the sample period.  As discussed in Section 2, much of the fraud which 
took place in the mining industries stemmed from investors purchasing equity securities 
that did not offer any return due to insiders absconding with investment outlays.  When 
the blue sky laws were passed, prohibiting such equity from being issued to the public, 
firms were ostensibly better able to raise stock from investors who were now protected 
from securities fraud.  The findings in Table 3 confirm this hypothesis.   
 
4.2 Firm Size 
 4.2.1 Physical Capital 
 The impact of investor protection statutes on firm size is estimated using two 
measures of size utilized in previous research:  plant, property, and equipment (PPE) and 
book value of assets.14  The impact of the blue sky laws on Ln(PPEit) is estimated using 
the following specification: 
 
Ln(PPEit)  = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi)  
                          + β5(Yeart) + εit 
(4)
  
where the dependent variable, Ln(PPEit) is the log of the Plant, Property, and Equipment 
of firm i in year t.  All independent covariates are the same as in Specification 1.  
Regression results are presented in Table 4.   
The coefficient of IPLaw measures the approximate elasticity of physical capital 
to the passage of a blue sky law.  Column 1 indicates the elasticity of physical capital to 
the passage of an investor protection law is approximately 48% (the point estimate of 
IPLaw is 0.394).  When year fixed effects are included in Column 2, the point estimate 
for IPLaw is .317, which is still economically large and statistically significant. The 
decrease in the coefficient illustrates the importance of aggregate fluctuations over time 
in investment.  Column 3 illustrates that Age has little power in explaining firm 
investment in physical capital.  The inclusion of Sales Growth in Columns 4-5 suggests 
that PPE is an expectedly increasing function of investment opportunities.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
14 The findings are quantitatively and qualitatively similar if market capitalization is used as an additional 
measure of firm size.   
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the point estimate of IPLaw increases to approximately 0.38.15  Overall, the various 
specifications in Table 4 indicate an economic and statistically significant impact of the 
blue sky laws on mean levels of physical capital. 
 
4.2.2 Total Assets 
 The impact of investor protection statutes on firm assets, measured by 
Ln(Assetsit), is estimated using the following specification: 
 
Ln(Assetsit) =  α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi)  
                          + β5(Yeart) + εit 
(5)
  
where the dependent variable, Ln(Assetsit) is the log of the book value of assets of firm i 
in year t.  All independent covariates are the same as in Specification 1.  Regression 
results are presented in Table 5.   
The coefficient of IPLaw measures the approximate elasticity of firm assets to the 
passage of a blue sky law.  Column 1 illustrates that the laws are associated with a 41% 
increase in firm assets.  When year fixed effects and Age are included in Columns 2-3, 
the point estimate for IPLaw decreases to 0.16, which is statistically significant at the 
10% level.  The inclusion of Sales Growth in Columns 4-5 causes point estimates of 
IPLaw to rise to approximately 0.2316.   
The results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the blue sky laws have a significant 
impact on firm investment in physical capital and total firm size.  The elasticity estimates 
of 41%-48% are somewhat large in economic magnitude, however, this is not 
unreasonable given the nature of the mining industry during the early 1900’s.  Many of 
the sample firms are copper, silver, and gold mining operations, in which the most 
significant assets owned by firms are the properties used for mineral excavation.  Casual 
observation of the data suggests that very little physical capital is devoted to machinery 
and equipment; the most valuable asset owned by a company is the land on which it 
                                                 
15 As mentioned earlier, however, it is possible that Sales Growth is endogenous with the laws, thus causing 
point estimates of IPLaw in Columns 4-5 to overstate the impact of the blue sky laws on PPE.  The main 
conclusion to be drawn from Columns 4-5 is that the inclusion of a proxy for investment opportunities does 
not minimize the impact of the laws on investment in physical capital.    
16 This change, however, is subject to the same caveats as those mentioned in Section 4.2.1. 
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operates.  Capital infusions spurred by the blue sky laws likely caused mining firms to 
increase total assets through purchases of large tracts of land or quarries, allowing for 
sudden, significant changes in physical capital and total asset size.  Such activity stands 
in contrast to industries where large adjustments to firm size come in the form of 
additional labor or machinery and equipment; comparably large, immediate changes in 
firm size for these industries in response to the blue sky laws would be unlikely.   
Overall, the economically large and statistically significant coefficient estimates 
of IPLaw in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with theories that predict investor protection 
laws lead to increased firm size (LLSV 1998, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, LLS 2008).  
The impact of the investor protection law on firm size is robust to the choice of 
econometric specification and the choice of the firm size measure.  In the context of the 
mining industry, the blue sky laws allowed firms to increase firm size through increased 
investment in physical capital and property used for mineral excavation.  This is 
interesting in light of the fact that much of the pre-existing securities fraud in the mining 
industry centered on investors being misled about the productivity of mining and drilling 
properties, as discussed in Section 2.   
 
4.3 Operating Performance and Valuation 
 The estimated effects of the blue sky laws on firm financing and investment 
decisions indicate that firms respond to the laws by paying out greater dividends, raising 
equity, and increasing firm size.  The findings are consistent with various theories 
regarding the importance of investor protections on corporate policy.  However, the 
changing nature of firm behavior in response to the laws per se does not indicate whether 
the increased activity by firms represents profitable activity.  To investigate this issue, I 
estimate the impact of the blue sky laws on firm profitability and market valuations.   
 
 4.3.1 Return on Assets 
The impact of investor protection statutes on operating performance, ROAit, is 
estimated using the following specification: 
 
ROAit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(Firmi) + β4(Yeart) + εit                             (6)
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where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  ROAit is defined 
as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the 
book value of assets for firm i in year t.  EBITDA is calculated using data on Sales and 
Total/Operating Expenses from firm income statements.  For many firms, interest 
expenses, deprecation, and taxes are either explicitly reported or not disclosed (and are 
thus potentially components of “Total/Operating Expenses” listed in the income 
statements).  It is unclear whether this measurement error induces any systematic bias in 
coefficient estimates.  It is likely that any measurement error increases the size of 
coefficient standard errors, causing coefficient estimates of IPLaw to understate the 
impact of investor protection laws on operating performance (in terms of statistical 
significance).  All other variables are defined as in Specification 1.  
 Regression estimates are presented in Table 6.  Columns 1-2 indicate that the 
coefficient for IPLaw is positive and statistically significant, at approximately 0.064.   
The coefficient for Age is statistically insignificant and economically trivial.  In results 
not reported here, the estimated coefficient for IPLaw remains economically large and 
statistically significant when the specification is estimated without year fixed effects. 
Overall, the results imply that the passage of investor protection law causes firms to 
improve their operating performance by 7%.   
 
 4.3.2 Market Capitalization to Cash Flow Ratios 
The impact of investor protection statutes on market valuations, MarketValueit / 
CashFlowit, following LLSV (2002), is estimated using the following specification: 
 
MarketValueit / CashFlowit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(Firmi) + β4(Yeart) + εit 
            
(7)
where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  MarketValueit is 
defined as the product of shares outstanding and stock price at the end of year t for firm i. 
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CashFlowit is defined as the sum of sales, net debt and equity issuance, minus the sum of 
operating expenses, net capital expenditures, and dividend payments for firm i in year t.17 
All other variables are defined as in Specification 1.  Sales Growth is not included in the 
regression because Sales are used to construct Cash Flow measures.   
Regression estimates are presented in Table 6.  Columns 3-4 indicate that the 
coefficient for IPLaw is positive and statistically significant, ranging between 12.6 and 
14.6.   These estimates indicate that improvements in investor protection law are 
associated with relative increases in market value to cash flows.  The coefficient for Age 
in Column 4 is economically large and statistically significant (55.6), suggesting that 
older firms have higher ratios of market value to cash flows.  This may appear 
counterintuitive, as younger firms typically have higher market valuations due to greater 
growth options than older firms.  However, in the context of the mining industry during 
the early 20th century, it is possible that older firms would have greater ability to expand 
existing operations and properties in order to excavate new mineral deposits, thereby 
causing them to have higher market-to-book valuations.   
The dependent variable captures the market’s valuation of a firm’s outstanding 
equity given its cash flows.  As discussed in LLSV (2002), this is a useful measure to 
examine the market’s valuation of cash flows and expropriation risk; the higher the risk 
of expropriation, the lower the market value of equity conditional on a given level of cash 
flows.  The evidence presented in Table 6 is strongly supportive of theories which predict 
that greater investor protections will lead to improved market valuations through reduced 
risk of insider expropriation (LLSV 2002).  
The findings in Table 6 indicate the increased economic activity of firms in the 
mining industry in response to the blue sky laws does not reflect negative NPV pursuits, 
such as wasteful mineral exploration or empire building.  The evidence is strongly 
supportive of theories that predict greater investor protections allow firms to better access 
positive NPV projects and improve performance (LLSV 2002, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
2002).   The collective findings suggest that once the blue sky laws are passed, firms in 
                                                 
17 Capital expenditures are not explicitly reported in the data, they are approximated by calculating annual 
changes in net PPE.  Changes in net working capital are not included because of data availability, however, 
casual inspection of the data suggests that changes in net working capital likely have a marginal impact on 
total cash flows.    
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the mining industry are better able to access external financing and pursue positive NPV 
projects, such as mineral excavations in fruitful tracts and quarries.  The performance 
implications of the blue sky laws are not just immediate changes in realized profits (Table 
6, Columns 1-2), but also changes in the market valuations of equity relative to changes 
in cash flows (Table 6, Columns 3-4).   
 
4.4 Alternative Hypotheses 
 A number of alternative explanations for the findings in Tables 2-6 are explored 
in the following subsections.  First, I evaluate the extent to which the blue sky laws may 
represent the political lobbying efforts of incumbent mining firms during the sample 
period.  Second, I examine whether the passage of the blue sky laws appears to be driven 
by unobservable changes in investment opportunities, manifest in either pre-existing 
trends or immediate changes in corporate policy.18  As discussed below, the findings do 
not appear to be driven by political economy considerations or unobservable changes in 
investment opportunities.  Third, I test whether the observed impact of the blue sky laws 
occurs through the channel of reduced expropriation risk or through the channel of 
reduced adverse selection in security dealer markets.  The evidence is strongly indicative 
of reduced expropriation risk.   
 
 4.4.1 Political Economy Hypotheses 
A significant amount of anecdotal evidence and academic research points to the 
prevention of securities fraud as the primary motivation for the passage of the blue sky 
laws (Seligman 1983, Reed and Washburn 1921, Mulvey 1914).  It is possible, however, 
that the blue sky laws were passed in response to lobbying pressure by industrial 
incumbents.  As discussed by Rajan and Zingales (2003), many investor protection laws 
could simply result from incumbent industrial firms who wish to reduce competition from 
potential market entrants by raising the costs of external financing, similar to the Macey 
and Miller (1991) hypothesis.  However, in contrast to the likelihood that banks’ 
lobbying power for the blue sky laws would cause coefficient estimates of IPLaw to be 
                                                 
18 The time trends analysis is also relevant for testing various political economy hypotheses as well as any 
hypotheses that would suggest reverse causality.   
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understated (Macey and Miller 1991), lobbying power by industrial incumbents could 
cause coefficient estimates of IPLaw to be overstated.  Such lobbying would imply that 
the passage of the blue sky laws could presumably increase the market power of 
incumbent firms by limiting entry by competitors.  As a result, existing firms would find 
it easier to issue equity, grow in size, and increase profits due to improved monopoly 
power in product markets.19   
To test this hypothesis, I collect data on the quantities and prices of metal ores 
produced by firms in the early 1900’s.  Because metal ores are homogenous products 
with little differentiation in characteristics, one can easily compare the prices and 
quantities of metal ores across different regions.  If the blue sky laws were encouraged by 
industrial incumbents, one would expect to see incumbent firms having increased 
monopoly power in product markets.  In a canonical model of imperfect product market 
competition, increased market power should lead to a decrease in the quantities of goods 
sold and an increase in prices, particularly by the types of well-established firms observed 
in this sample. 
To measure the impact of the blue sky laws on the quantities and prices of ores 
sold by mining firms, I estimate the following baseline specification: 
 
Ln(Quantityit) [OR] Ln(Priceit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit 
            
(8)
where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  Ln(Quantityit) is 
defined as the log of ore quantities (tons or ounces) produced, while Ln(Priceit)  is the log 
of ore prices (per ton or ounce) sold by firm i in year t.  All other variables are defined as in 
Specification 1.   
  The results are presented in Table 7.  Columns 1-3 present estimates of the 
impact of the laws on the quantities of Copper, Silver, and Gold ores, while Columns 4-6 
present the impact of the laws on the prices of Copper, Silver, and Gold ores.  The results 
on ore quantities indicate that the blue sky laws are associated with increases in quantities 
of ores produced.  The coefficient estimates of 0.43 for IPLaw in Column 2 and 0.66 for 
IPLaw in Column 3 are economically large.  The results imply that the passage of the 
                                                 
19 It is not clear, however, how improved market power would influence dividend payments.   
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blue sky laws cause mean quantities of silver sold to increase by approximately 55%, 
while gold quantities almost double (94% increase).  The magnitudes are extremely large, 
yet somewhat imprecise, particularly in the case of gold production.  The impact on 
copper production is statistically insignificant, but the positive coefficient implies that 
copper production does not decrease significantly in response to the blue sky laws.   
Columns 4-6 illustrate that estimates of the laws’ impact on ore prices are statistically 
insignificant.  The measured coefficient on copper and gold prices is economically trivial, 
while the price effect for silver is qualitatively negative. 
Overall, the laws appear to have a positive effect on the quantities of ores sold and 
an insignificant or negative impact on the prices of mineral ores; product markets appear 
to become more competitive after the investor protection laws are passed.  The results 
contradict the hypothesis that the blue sky laws reflect increases in industrial product 
market power, which would cause a decrease in quantities and increase in prices of goods 
sold.  The statistical estimates corroborate anecdotal evidence that suggests political 
lobbying by incumbent mining firms did not play a significant role in promoting the 
passage of the blue sky laws.   
 
 4.4.2 Endogenous Timing of Regulatory Reform 
 This section presents estimates of the average changes in corporate policy and 
performance during several time periods around the passage of the blue sky laws (time 
trends analysis).  The estimates are useful for evaluating the possibility that the investor 
protection statutes were passed either in response to or in conjunction with unobservable 
changes in investment opportunities in states that passed laws during the sample period.  
Examples of such changes in the mining industry could consist of growth in product 
demand, improvements in excavation technologies, new discoveries of mineral ore 
deposits, etc.  If the laws were passed at the same time that investment opportunities 
improved in sample treatment states, then the regression estimates of Specifications 2-7 
in Tables 2-6 would overstate the impact of the blue sky laws on corporate policy and 
performance.20      
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that sales growth, a commonly used proxy for investment opportunities (LLSV 2002), 
does not change significantly around the passage of investor protection laws.   
 25
First, I repeat the analysis of Tables 2-6 by broadening the specifications 
estimated in each table.  The new specification is the following OLS linear model: 
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit_Beforeit(-2)) + β2(IPLawit_Beforeit(-1)) +   
                             β3(IPLawit_Afterit(0)) + β4(IPLawit_Afterit(+1)) + β5(IPLawit_Afterit(+2))    
                             + β7(Firmi)) + β8(Yeart) + εit 
  
(9)
where subscripts it uniquely identify an observation for firm i in year t.  
IPLawit_Beforeit(-2, -1) is an indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t 
takes place (2 years, 1 year) before an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
incorporation for firm i.  IPLawit_Afterit(0, 1, 2+) is an indicator for whether the 
observation for firm i in year t takes place (0 years, 1 year, 2 or more years) after an 
investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  All other 
variables are defined as in Specification 1.     
If there are underlying trends in the corporate policies of firms before the laws are 
passed, then the coefficients of the terms IPLawit_Before(-2) and IPLaw_Before(-1) 
should be positive and significant.  However, as depicted in Table 9, the data contradict 
this hypothesis.  Column 1 contains estimates of the coefficients when Dividends/Sales is 
the dependent variable in Specification 9.  The coefficients for IPLawit_Before(-2) and 
IPLaw_Before(-1) are both economically small and statistically insignificant.  The point 
estimate of IPLaw_Before(-1) is actually negative (-0.015).  In contrast, the coefficients 
for IPLawit_Afterit(0) and IPLawit_Afterit(1) are both economically large and statistically 
significant; they are approximately 0.090 each.  The coefficient for IPLawit_Afterit(2+) is 
also economically large and positive, but statistically insignificant.  The results imply that 
mean dividends-to-sales ratios increased in the years immediately following the passage 
of the blue sky laws.  The magnitude of the increase in each year mirrors the total 
estimated impact of the laws on dividends/sales presented in Table 2.  Additionally, the 
small size of the pre-law time period coefficients indicate that dividend payouts were not 
already changing significantly prior to the passage of the blue sky laws.  The estimates 
strongly support the causal interpretation of the results presented in Tables 2-8.   
Across all other specifications in Table 9, the coefficients for IPLaw_Before(-2) 
and IPLaw_Before(-1) are statistically insignificant, while the coefficients for 
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IPLaw_After(0), IPLaw_After(1), and IPLaw_After(2+) are positive, statistically 
significant, and economically large (both in absolute terms as well as relative to the 
coefficients for pre-period trends).  The findings strongly support the identifying 
assumption that the passage of the blue sky laws was not endogenous with changes in 
unobservable investment opportunities or other pre-existing trends in corporate policy.   
To further explore the possibility that the blue sky laws were passed as a result of 
changes in investment opportunities, a second set of tests is conducted.  This set of 
analysis addresses the possibility that investment opportunities or other unobservable 
drivers of corporate policy in blue sky states changed immediately at the same times that 
the laws were passed in various states.21  To explore the relevance of this scenario, I re-
estimate the time-trends model (Specification 9) on a subsample of data.  Specifically, I 
keep all firms located in states that do not pass blue sky laws during the sample period, 
and all firms incorporated in Michigan and West Virginia.  As discussed in Section 2, the 
blue sky statutes in Michigan and West Virginia were initially passed in 1913, only to be 
declared unconstitutional by federal courts shortly thereafter (Reed and Washburn 1921).  
Both states subsequently revised their laws and passed modified blue sky statutes in 
1915.  If the laws were proposed and passed at the same that there were immediate 
changes in unobservable investment opportunities, then the impact of the laws should be 
observed starting in 1913, rather than 1915, for firms in Michigan and West Virginia. 
Table 10 presents regression estimates of Specification 9 on this subsample of 
data.  Across all specifications, the coefficients for IPLaw_Before(-2) and 
IPLaw_Before(-1) are negative or statistically insignificant.  The lone exception is the 
coefficient for IPLaw_Before(-2) in the Dividends/Sales analysis, which is only 
marginally significant and likely inconsequential in light of the negative coefficient for 
IPLaw_Before(-1)).  If the laws were coincidental with immediate changes in investment 
opportunities, then the coefficients for IPLaw_Before(-2) and IPLaw_Before(-1) should 
be positive and statistically significant.  The findings in Table 10 strongly reject this 
hypothesis, thus further supporting the causal interpretation of the results in Tables 2-8. 
                                                 
21 This second set of analysis also provides a different means of evaluating the more general possibility of 
time trends in corporate policy prior to the laws being passed.  For example, pre-period point estimates in 
Table 9, while economically small and statistically insignificant, do appear larger in magnitude for the year 
before the law than 2 years before the law. 
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4.4.3 Adverse Selection vs. Reduced Expropriation Risk 
The blue sky laws provided investors with a legal basis for recovering damages 
from firms that were deemed to be fraudulent following public security issuances (Reed 
and Washburn 1921, Virginia Law Review 1937).  In addition, many laws also required 
that securities be registered with the government prior to any public issuance.  It is 
therefore possible that the impact of the blue sky laws estimated in Tables 2-6 is manifest 
through the channel of reduced adverse selection at the pre-clearance stage rather than 
through the reduced risk of expropriation by insiders conditional on securities already 
being issued.22 
To evaluate this possibility, I repeat the analysis of Tables 2-6 on a selected set of 
firms.  Specifically, I keep all control firms (i.e. all firms located in states that do not pass 
blue sky laws during the sample period as well as any pre-blue sky law observations for 
firms in states which pass the laws during the sample period), and treatment firms 
incorporated in Maine.  The blue sky provisions in Maine were unique from the blue sky 
provisions in other states which passed laws during the sample period because Maine did 
not require pre-clearance of offerings, but did prohibit ex-post fraud (Mahoney 2003).  If 
the channel through which the laws affected corporate policy is the reduction adverse 
selection at the pre-clearance stage rather than ex-post reduction in expropriation risk, 
then the impact of the laws in Maine should be statistically insignificant.   
 I estimate Specifications 2-5 using this subsample of firms.  The results are 
presented in Table 8.  Across all columns, the estimated coefficient of IPLaw is 
economically large and statistically significant.  The impact of the Maine blue sky law on 
dividend payouts, equity outstanding, firm size, and performance quantitatively and 
qualitatively mirrors the estimated average impact of all blue sky laws on the full sample 
of firms.  The findings are strongly supportive of the mechanism that the impact of the 
blue sky laws is through reduced risk of expropriation by insiders rather than reduced 
adverse selection in securities markets due to security pre-clearance requirements. 
 
 
                                                 
22 These hypotheses are not mutual exclusive; it is possible that reduced expropriation risk was manifest by 
higher quality securities being offered to the government for pre-clearance.   
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Conclusion 
 The findings in this paper address recent debate concerning the theoretical and 
empirical relevance of investor protection laws.  While some research argues that legal 
protection of investors from insider expropriation is critical to a well designed system of 
corporate governance, others argue that investor protection laws have limited importance. 
This paper attempts to improve upon existing empirical strategies which rely primarily on 
either cross-country studies that utilize legal origin as a key source of variation in 
investor protection law, or identification strategies which rely primarily on time-series 
variation in country-wide regulatory reform.    
Holding legal origin fixed, and exploiting both cross sectional and time series 
exogenous variation in the passage of investor protection laws across U.S. states in the 
early 20th century, I find that firms respond to the introduction of investor protection 
statutes by raising equity, increasing dividend payouts, and growing in size.  The laws are 
also associated with improvements in accounting performance and market valuations.  
The evidence is strongly supportive of theories which predict that investor protection 
laws have a significant impact on corporate investment and financing policy.  Additional 
analysis suggests that alternative explanations for the findings have limited support in the 
data.  In particular, the patterns in investment and financing do not appear to be biased by 
political economy considerations, reduced adverse selection in securities dealers markets, 
or endogenous timing of the laws with changes in investment opportunities. 
The results in this paper point to several avenues for additional research.  First, it 
would be interesting to explore the additional implications of investor protection laws on 
the functioning of securities markets.  Recent work by Wang (2008) has begun to explore 
this line of inquiry.  A second avenue of research would be to more deeply explore the 
mechanisms underlying the enforcement of investor protection laws and identifying the 
extent to which investor protection laws are compliments or substitutes for other aspects 
of capital markets reform.  
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 This table presents descriptive statistics of sample firm characteristics.  Panel A 
indicates the sample contains 108 firms in mining industries with observations taken 
across sample years 1899-1918 for a total of 887 firm-year observations.  Mean age of 
firm refers to the average age of a firm in a typical firm-year observation.  Panel B 
contains means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of firm characteristics in 1911, 
separated by firms in states which pass laws during the sample period (<=1918) and firms 
in states which pass the laws after the sample period (>1918).  Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales in 1911 relative to 1910.  Assets and PPE (Plant, Property, and 
Equipment) are given in book values.  Market Capitalization is number of shares 
outstanding times share price as of end of December, 1911.  Dividend/Sales is the ratio of 
dividends on common stock to sales.  ROA is the return on assets; it is defined as 
operating earnings divided by book value of assets. P-values refer to t-tests on firm 
characteristics between the two groups of sample firms.  Panel C lists sample states and 
the years in which they pass blue sky laws.  
 
Panel A: Sample Characteristics 
Total Number of Firms 108 
Sample Years 1899-1918 
Total Number of Firm-Year Observations 887 
Mean year of Incorporation 1899 
Mean age (years) 13 
Panel B: Sample Firm Characteristics 
Year = 1911 Law Passed > 1918 Law Passed <= 1918 p-value 
2,423,439 2,501,990 0.95 Sales 
(3,171,208) (5,969,495)  
0.28 0.45 0.67 Sales Growth 
(1.44) (1.42)  
11.00 13.58 0.34 Age 
(6.05) (13.57)  
6,868,768 7,189,511 0.92 PPE 
(6,075,688) (14,600,000)  
9,248,538 9,337,267 0.98 Assets 
(10,100,000) (19,100,000)  
30,600,000 11,100,000 0.27 Market 
Capitalization (104,000,000) (26,800,000)  
0.29 0.20 0.28 Dividends/Sales 
(0.31) (0.26)  
0.15 0.08 0.52 ROA 
(0.18) (0.40)  
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Table 1 (continued): 
 
Panel C: Sample States 
State Year of Law Passage 
Arizona 1912 
Alabama 1919 
California 1913 
Canada ---- 
Colorado 1923 
Delaware 1931 
Maine 1913 
Michigan 1915 
Minnesota 1917 
Missouri 1913 
Montana 1913 
New Jersey 1920 
Nevada ---- 
New York 1921 
Pennsylvania 1923 
Texas 1913 
Virginia 1916 
West Virginia 1915 
Wyoming  1919 
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Table 2: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Payout Policy 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on firm 
dividend payments.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Dividendit / Salesit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(Firmi) + β4(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Dividendit / 
Salesit is the ratio of dividend payments on common stock to sales of firm i in year t (Columns 1-
3).  In Columns 4-5, Dividendit / Salesit is the ratio of dividend payments on common stock plus 
dividends on preferred stock to sales of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the 
state of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) Law by year t.  Ln(Age)it is 
the log of the age of firm i in year t.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered 
by state. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: Dividend/Sales            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.026* 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) 
Age   0.114***  0.086 
   (0.037)  (0.053) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.359** 0.176 0.369** 0.233 
 (0.003) (0.123) (0.147) (0.126) (0.166) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.003 0.075 0.089 0.078 0.086 
No. of firms 78 78 76 78 76 
No. of obs. 539 539 533 539 533 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 3: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Equity Issuance 
This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on firm 
common stock outstanding.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Sharesit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi) + β5(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Shares)it is 
the log of the number of outstanding shares of common stock of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an 
indicator of whether the state of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) 
Law by year t.  SalesGrowthit is the percentage change in sales of firm i from year t-1 to year t.  
Ln(Age)it is the log of the age of firm i in year t.  Firmt and Yeart denote firm and year fixed 
effects, respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered by state. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Shares Outstanding) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) 
Age   -0.009  0.014 
   (0.023)  (0.022) 
Sales Growth    0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 12.574*** 12.585*** 12.553*** 12.507*** 12.478*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.039) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.045 0.047 0.093 0.093 
No. of firms 91 91 88 76 75 
No. of obs. 705 705 683 482 479 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Firm Size (PPE) 
This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on firm plant, 
property, and equipment.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(PPEit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi) + β5(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(PPE)it is the 
log of Plant, Property, and Equipment of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the 
state of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) Law by year t.  
SalesGrowthit is the percentage change in sales of firm i from year t-1 to year t.  Ln(Age)it is the 
log of the age of firm i in year t.  Firmt and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(PPE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.394*** 0.317** 0.327** 0.384*** 0.383*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.116) (0.118) 
Age   -0.094  0.115 
   (0.149)  (0.303) 
Sales Growth    0.004** 0.005** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 14.543*** 14.559*** 14.793*** 14.338*** 14.328*** 
 (0.039) (0.069) (0.402) (0.252) (0.840) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.109 0.148 0.148 0.178 0.179 
No. of firms 95 95 93 83 82 
No. of obs. 603 603 590 437 435 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 5: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Firm Size (Assets) 
This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on firm size.  
The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Assetsit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(SalesGrowthit)) + β4(Firmi) + β5(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Assets)it is 
the log of the book value of assets of firm i in year t.  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the state 
of incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) Law by year t.  SalesGrowthit is 
the percentage change in sales of firm i from year t-1 to year t.  Ln(Age)it is the log of the age of 
firm i in year t.  Firmt and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Assets) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPLaw 0.347*** 0.168* 0.163* 0.234** 0.233** 
 (0.101) (0.090) (0.092) (0.084) (0.082) 
Age   0.03  -0.027 
   (0.065)  (0.120) 
Sales Growth    0.005*** 0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 14.939*** 15.283*** 15.219*** 14.900*** 15.237*** 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.114) (0.128) (0.360) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.124 0.207 0.206 0.294 0.294 
No. of firms 99 99 97 87 86 
No. of obs. 679 679 666 490 488 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Performance 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on firm 
accounting performance (ROA) and market valuations (market capitalization to cash flow).  The 
baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
ROAit [or] MarketCapit /CashFlowit = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(ln(Ageit)) + β3(Firmi) + β4(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  ROAit is the ratio 
of operating income before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the book value of assets 
of firm i in year t (Columns 1-2).  MarketCapit / CashFlowit is the ratio of market capitalization to 
cash flow of firm i in year t (Columns 3-4).  IPLawit is an indicator of whether the state of 
incorporation of firm i has passed an Investor Protection (IP) Law by year t.  Ln(Age)it is the log 
of the age of firm i in year t.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Regression results are presented for sample data winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles for ROA 
and MarketCap/CashFlow, separately. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
 Dep. Var.: Return on Assets Dep. Var: Market Cap to Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IPLaw 0.064** 0.064** 14.564** 12.638** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (5.716) (4.937) 
Age  -0.004  55.595*** 
  (0.090)  (17.848) 
Constant 0.374*** 0.383* 3.645 -121.685*** 
 (0.011) (0.200) (2.118) (30.068) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.175 0.174 0.041 0.065 
No. of firms 88 86 66 65 
No. of obs. 473 470 270 269 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7: 
Estimated Effects of Investor Protection Laws on Product Markets 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on quantities and prices of metal ores produced by mining 
firms.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Ln(Quantityit) [or] Ln(Priceit) = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  Ln(Quantityit) is the log of quantity (tons or ounces) of metal ores 
produced by firm i in year t (Columns 1-3).  Ln(Priceit) is the log of price of ores produced by firm i in year t (Columns 4-6).  Firmi and Yeart 
denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  Each column in the table refers to a distinct ore: copper, silver, or gold.  Standard errors, reported 
in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
 Dependent Var.: Ln(Quantity) Dependent Var.: Ln(Price) 
 Copper Silver Gold Copper Silver Gold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw 0.098 0.436** 0.661* 0.002 -0.031 0.001 
 (0.159) (0.180) (0.324) (0.016) (0.044) (0.218) 
Constant 15.634*** 13.138*** 9.218*** 2.431*** 2.570*** 2.612*** 
 (0.073) (0.335) (0.143) (0.001) (0.042) (0.179) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.110 0.166 0.125 0.905 0.251 0.097 
No. of firms 66 44 38 31 17 13 
No. of obs. 498 281 259 176 80 79 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 40
Table 8: 
Analysis of Adverse Selection vs. Insider Expropriation Hypotheses 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on the dependent variables examined in Tables 2 through 6.  
The sample is restricted to firms located in Maine (subject to “ex-post” investor protection laws) and firms incorporated in states which have not 
passed a blue sky law in year t (all sample control firms).  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit) + β2(Firmi) + β3(Yeart) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  The dependent variables are Dividendsit/Salesit, Ln(Shares 
Oustandingit), Ln(PPEit), Ln(Assetsit), ROAit, and Market Capit/Cash Flowit for firm i in year t (Columns 1-6).  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and 
year fixed effects, respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Dividends/Sales Ln(Shares Oustanding) Ln(PPE)  Ln(Assets)  ROA  
Market 
Cap/Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw 0.061*** 0.110*** 0.203** 0.110** 0.064*** 24.746** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.077) (0.048) (0.017) (8.147) 
Constant 0.352** 12.650*** 14.609*** 15.072*** 0.303*** 1.562 
 (0.132) (0.012) (0.031) (0.020) (0.075) (3.078) 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.090 0.026 0.079 0.113 0.185 0.061 
No. of firms 73 87 88 92 79 58 
No. of obs. 466 603 515 566 386 222 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 9: 
Analysis of Time Trends in Regression Estimates 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on the dependent variables examined in Tables 2 through 6, 
split into sub-periods before and after the passage of the laws. The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit_Beforeit(-2)) + β2(IPLawit_Beforeit(-1)) + β3(IPLawit_Afterit(0)) + β4(IPLawit_Afterit(1)) +  
   β5(IPLawit_Afterit(2+)) + β6(Firmi) + β7(Yeari) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  The dependent variables are Dividendsit/Salesit, Ln(Shares 
Oustandingit), Ln(PPEit), Ln(Assetsit), ROAit, and Market Capit/Cash Flowit for firm i in year t (Columns 1-6).  IPLawit_Beforeit(-2, -1) is an 
indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years, 1 year) before an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
incorporation for firm i.  IPLawit_Afterit(0, 1, 2+) is an indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (0 years, 1 year, 2 or 
more) years after an investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Dividends/Sales Ln(Shares Oustanding) Ln(PPE)  Ln(Assets)  ROA  
Market 
Cap/Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw_Before(-2) 0.009 -0.010 0.048 -0.054 -0.016 6.366 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.079) (0.057) (0.014) (8.653) 
IPLaw_Before(-1) -0.015 0.028 0.120 0.036 -0.001 12.580 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.105) (0.048) (0.017) (10.343) 
IPLaw_After(0) 0.090*** 0.111** 0.330* 0.164* 0.045 20.129 
 (0.025) (0.046) (0.169) (0.092) (0.029) (11.864) 
IPLaw_After(1) 0.087* 0.149** 0.429* 0.157 0.073 25.956* 
 (0.041) (0.063) (0.232) (0.111) (0.043) (12.680) 
IPLaw_After(2+) 0.098 0.186*** 0.492* 0.173 0.061** 35.437** 
 (0.067) (0.056) (0.263) (0.130) (0.028) (13.460) 
Constant 0.359** 12.585*** 14.414*** 15.005*** 0.373*** 0.582 
 (0.123) (0.019) (0.175) (0.111) (0.011) (2.120) 
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Table 9, continued: 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.076 0.048 0.070 0.097 0.074 0.023 
No. of firms 78 91 95 99 88 66 
No. of obs. 539 705 603 679 473 270 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 10: 
Analysis of Michigan and West Virginia Firms 
 This table presents estimates of the effects of state investor protection laws on the dependent variables examined in Tables 2 through 6.  
The sample is restricted to firms located in Michigan and West Virginia (where initial investor protection laws passed in 1913 were declared 
unconstitutional by federal courts; revised IP Laws were passed in 1915) and firms located in states that do not pass investor protection laws 
during the sample period.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear model: 
 
Dependent Var. = α + β1(IPLawit_Beforeit(-2)) + β2(IPLawit_Beforeit(-1)) + β3(IPLawit_Afterit(0)) + β4(IPLawit_Afterit(1)) +  
   β5(IPLawit_Afterit(2+)) + β6(Firmi) + β7(Yeari) + εit 
 
where subscripts it uniquely identify individual observations for firm i in year t.  The dependent variables are Dividendsit/Salesit, Ln(Shares 
Oustandingit), Ln(PPEit), Ln(Assetsit), ROAit, and Market Capit/Cash Flowit for firm i in year t (Columns 1-6).  IPLawit_Beforeit(-2, -1) is an 
indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (2 years, 1 year) before an investor protection law is passed in the state of 
incorporation for firm i.  IPLawit_Afterit(0, 1, 2+) is an indicator for whether the observation for firm i in year t takes place (0 years, 1 year, 2 or 
more) years after an investor protection law is passed in the state of incorporation for firm i.  Firmi and Yeart denote firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
 
 Dependent Variables: 
 Dividends/Sales Ln(Shares Oustanding) Ln(PPE)  Ln(Assets)  ROA  
Market 
Cap/Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IPLaw_Before(-2) 0.060* -0.023 -0.059 -0.200** -0.021* 0.063 
 (0.031) (0.021) (0.113) (0.071) (0.010) (11.456) 
IPLaw_Before(-1) -0.073 -0.036 0.059 -0.035 -0.007 -2.967 
 (0.050) (0.023) (0.120) (0.0620) (0.017) (21.177) 
IPLaw_After(0) 0.072* 0.060** 0.401** 0.207** 0.066** 14.104 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.167) (0.085) (0.025) (10.894) 
IPLaw_After(1) 0.126** 0.186*** 0.826** 0.320** 0.205*** 16.669*** 
 (0.042) (0.027) (0.324) (0.115) (0.054) (4.106) 
IPLaw_After(2+) 0.327** 0.189*** 0.953 0.179 0.063 30.784** 
 (0.120) (0.042) (0.603) (0.243) (0.037) (11.611) 
Constant 0.204*** 12.427*** 13.812*** 14.505*** 0.101*** -15.378 
 (0.037) (0.007) (0.160) (0.080) (0.028) (11.680) 
 44
 45
Table 10, continued:       
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.138 0.039 0.175 0.195 0.172 0.081 
No. of firms 50 63 61 63 55 42 
No. of obs. 361 499 363 433 306 180 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
